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Abstract
This paper shows that a firm may use non-targeted advertising to
exploit consumers’ desire for social status. A monopolist sells multiple
varieties of a status good to consumers who each care about what others
believe about their wealth. Advertising allows a consumer to buy a variety,
and also makes that variety visible to him when others buy.
In equilibrium, the firm advertises each variety to consumers who will
buy, but also to all poorer consumers who will not. Poorer consumers
then understand what the goods signals, which increases the willingness
to pay of those who buy. If concern for status is sufficiently high, then
the firm restricts the number of varieties on the market to better promote
signaling. Status externalities leave even some wealthy consumers worse
off, and a ban on non-targeted advertising will increase social welfare.
1 Introduction
Firms sometimes advertise high-end goods to a broad public, at a price that
most people cannot afford. One example is advertising for cars. Audi spent six
million dollars to advertise its $118 000 R8 during the broadcast of Super Bowl
XLII, reaching almost one hundred million viewers.1 Prior to the 2008 Formula
1 Canada Grand Prix, Honda showcased its $100 000 Acura NSX at a popular
street festival attended by hundreds of thousands of visitors.2
Advertising for clothes provides similar examples. The first three selections
in Vogue magazine’s 2008 fall fashion section were a $1200 trenchcoat, a $5500
watch and $600 shoes. Handbags cost between $1700 and $3300.3 Twenty out
of thirty-five items from Elle’s fall fashion section cost over $700, including a
∗I would like to thank my supervisor Maarten Janssen, Bauke Visser, Stefano Puntoni,
Chaim Fershtman, Tore Ellingsen and Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda for helpful comments, as well as
participants in the III Conference on the Economics of Advertising and Marketing, 2009 Euro-
pean Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, ASSET 2009, and seminars in Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, Stockholm and Copenhagen.
†Tinbergen Institute and Erasmus University Rotterdam, vikander@tinbergen.nl,
www.tinbergen.nl/∼vikander
1Brandweek, 12/15/2008, Vol.49, Issue 44 p6-6
2www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/June2008/03/c7902
3www.style.com/trendsshopping/theshopper/082008/
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Peacock feather skirt for $2500.4 Both are mass circulation magazines, with a
readership of approximately one million.
Similarly, large advertising campaigns made Nike Air Jordan shoes and the
Apple iPhone household names, even though they were both mainly competing
with high-end brands.5
These firms could not reasonably expect most consumers they reach to buy
their products. It would seem more efficient to target ads at consumers more
likely to buy, which is after all what many firms do. They often put great
effort into selecting which of distinct audiences to reach via specialized cable
television, satellite radio, and magazines (Esteban et al. 2006).
Moreover, targeting technology continues to improve. Different households
watching the same program on cable tv may simultaneously receive different ads,
and someone surfing the internet will receive ads based on his personal browsing
history and the exact search query typed into Google or Yahoo (Johnson 2009).
What then makes the above examples of non-targeted advertising so different?
This paper puts forward an explanation based on two ideas. First, consumers
value social status which depends on what other consumers believe about their
wealth. Second, advertising informs consumers in two different respects. It
informs them of the existence of goods and allows them to buy, and it also
allows consumers to recognize goods when bought by others.
Recognizing essentially means consumers can identify a good for what it is
when they see it. An uninformed consumer who sees a state of the art smart-
phone might confuse it with a standard phone, but a consumer who recognizes
it can infer something about the owner as someone who owns a high-end good.
Non-targeted advertising, defined here as advertising to people who are not
expected to buy, therefore helps consumers signal to each other through their
purchases.
Some features of this explanation appear in previous economic analysis of
social status, such as Veblen (1899), Frank (1985), Ireland (1994) and Bagwell
and Bernheim (1996). Status depends on beliefs about an unobserved character-
istic, such as wealth or ability, and actions only affect status to the extent they
influence beliefs. High status is associated with a high level of the characteristic,
either in absolute terms or compared to some reference point.6
These papers emphasize that signaling through consumption is only possible
if goods are visible to others, since only then can consumption influence beliefs.
I take the approach that physical visibility is not enough. Consumers must
also recognize the good to understand what having it means, creating a role for
non-targeted advertising.
This mechanism could only work for physically visible goods, which suggests
why the above examples of non-targeted advertising are different. Cars, clothes
and portable technology all tend to be highly visible.
4www.elle.com/fashionspotlight
5Advertising Age, 6/25/2007, Vol. 78, Issue 26, p8-8
6The mechanism would not work if people liked to conform as in Bernheim (1994), or
disliked inequity as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). But Kapferer and Bastien (2009) argues that
people’s desire for social stratification is the driver for luxury good sales.
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The economics literature on advertising has largely ignored the possibility
that a firm can use broad non-targeted advertising to exploit consumers’ desire
for social status, by allowing them to signal through their purchases.
A number of authors in other fields, particularly marketing, have nonetheless
alluded to this type of mechanism. Their arguments are informal, and often
presented in terms of strengthening brand image. A brand is an idea, and the
idea is more powerful if widely shared. More people should therefore be familiar
with the brand than just the consumers who buy (Kotler and Keller 2008). It
is precisely because everyone knows BMW and what it stands for, even those
who will never buy a BMW car, that the brand has so much power (Kapferer
2008).
Kapferer and Bastien (2009) make a similar point in the specific context of
luxury goods. They espouse what they call an anti-law of marketing, that many
more people should be familiar with a luxury brand than those who are likely
to buy. They contrast this approach to traditional advertising campaigns which
focus only on the target market.
Miller (2009) makes a similar argument, which is clearly expressed in the
following passage:
The luxury brands with the highest brand equity ... advertise
in Vogue and GQ not so much to inform rich potential consumers
that they exist, but to reassure rich potential consumers that poorer
Vogue and GQ readers will recognize and respect these brands when
they see them displayed by others. (Miller 126)
To the best of my knowledge, only two papers in the advertising literature
have modeled how ads can help consumers signal through their purchases. The
first such paper is Wernerfelt (1990), which uses a very different framework
than the current paper. Whereas I assume all consumers want be thought of
as wealthy, Wernerfelt considers horizontal differentiation where all consumers
want to reveal their type. Firms compete in advertising to name brands. Ad-
vertising allows firms to engage in cheap talk, where an ad effectively suggests
a meaning for the brand. Consumers of different types can then coordinate on
the brands which best express their identify.
In a short section, Wernerfelt also looks at vertically differentiation and
argues that advertising can help sustain an equilibrium in a repeated setting.
It does so by dissipating profits. The reasoning is that firms who only sell to
high types may be tempted to deviate, and sell the “afterglow” of the positive
signal to low types in a future period. The deviation would be unattractive if
these firms made sufficiently high equilibrium profits, but positive profits would
encourage entry. An alternative way to support the equilibrium is to assume
that high types will only buy from firms which advertise the most, where the
exact number of these firms is defined so that expected profits are zero. This
relationship between advertising and consumer beliefs seems rather ad hoc, as it
is defined by equilibrium conditions on the supply side of the market. Wernerfelt
argues these beliefs are reasonable, but he admits the approach is not completely
satisfactory.
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More similar to the current paper is Krahmer (2006). He looks at duopoly,
where firms compete in prices and advertising, and where each firm sells a single
brand. Consumers are either high or low type, and they derive social status if
members of “the public” believe they are high type. Members of the public can
only recognize a brand if they have received an ad for it. The role of advertising
is therefore to inform the public of brand names, so high types can signal through
their purchases. In this set-up, advertising has some similarities with an all pay
auction. In a separating equilibrium, all high types will buy the brand that is
more heavily advertised, since they can then more effectively reveal their type.
Krahmer shows that when firms act sequentially, the incumbent may over-
advertise to deter entry. The incumbent knows that an entrant would have
to outadvertise it to makes any sales, and anticipates this by itself advertising
above the monopoly level. Equilibrium advertising tends to be higher than the
social optimum, and this effect is exacerbated by competition. In monopoly,
a firm overadvertises because it does not internalize how ads reduce the social
status of low types who do not buy. In duopoly, an added effect pushes the
firm in the same direction. If firms advertise sequentially, an incumbent may
waste resources to dissuade entry, while if firms advertise simultaneously, they
will waste resources competing with each other for high types.
Though the basic mechanism in this paper is similar to Krahmer, there are
a number of important differences which lead to new results. First, I look at a
different setting. Rather than looking at duopoly where each firm sells a single
brand, I consider a monopolist who sells multiple varieties. This leads to very
different strategic considerations for the firm. It does not have to consider how
advertising affects competition with its rival, but rather how advertising affects
competition between its own varieties. In this setting, it is not clear whether the
firm will still broadly advertise varieties bought by high types. It may also want
to sell some varieties to lower types, which forces it to internalize the negative
effect these ads would have on lower types’ status.
Second, this paper is the first to recognize that informative advertising can
simultaneously play two roles. As in the traditional approach, it informs con-
sumers of the existence of goods and allows them to buy. At the same time, it
allows consumers to recognize goods when others buy, so that they can signal
to each other through their purchase. Krahmer only considers the second role,
and makes a distinction between two groups: consumers, who are fully informed
and can buy in the absence of advertising, and the public, who are uninformed
and never buy but whose beliefs determine social status.
Taken together, these differences generate a trade-off in the firm’s choice
of advertising that has not been considered before in the literature. Broad
non-targeted advertising makes varieties widely recognized, which facilitates
signaling and increases willingness to pay through status effects. But it also
informs individual consumers about different varieties which effectively compete
with one another. This reduces the firm’s ability to price discriminate, forcing it
to reduce the mark-ups of varieties sold to higher types. The firm must therefore
weigh its desire to exploit status effects against its desire to price discriminate.
The trade-off between exploiting status effects and price discrimination drives
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the paper’s main results. For each variety, it determines the general extent to
which the firm uses non-targeted advertising, but also to which specific groups
of consumers it will advertise.
I show that in equilibrium, the firm advertises each variety to those who
buy it, and to all lower types. The model therefore predicts that poor people
will receive more ads than wealthy people, but mostly for varieties they cannot
afford. It also predicts that a person will be better able to distinguish between
different people who are wealthier than him, than between different people who
are poorer.
In particular, the firm advertises the variety bought by the highest types to
all consumers. That is the case even if the firm fully internalizes the negative
status effect on low types, and even though advertising is costly and status is a
zero sum game. The intuition is that these ads makes consumers’ outside option
less attractive, effectively increasing the stigma from buying nothing.
Moreover, the firm uses some non-targeted advertising even for varieties
bought by very low types. It does so even though this makes low types easier
to recognize and they suffer low social status. The intuition is that advertis-
ing high-end varieties generates unraveling. If the firm broadly advertises the
varieties bought by all higher types, then a low type will be willing to pay to
distinguish himself from those who are still lower. Unraveling implies that the
best way to exploit status effects would be to advertise each variety to all con-
sumers. However, doing so would reduce the firm’s ability to price discriminate.
The firm balances these concerns by advertising each variety only to poorer
consumers who have lower willingness to pay, and who strictly prefer their own
cheaper variety.
The firm’s desire to exploit status effects does more than influence its choice
of advertising. It can also cause the firm to restrict the number of varieties it
places on the market. If consumers care enough about social status, then in
equilibrium the firm will sell only a single variety. In such a situation, the firm
prefers to abandon any attempt to price discriminate and instead fully exploits
status effects. To do so, its must advertise each variety to all consumers to
maximize the stigma from buying nothing. Advertising is costly, so the cheapest
way to do so is to sell a single variety.
The only comparable result in the literature is Rayo (2005), who also shows
a monopolist may restrict the number of varieties to exploit status effects. His
mechanism is very different, however, as consumers are already informed about
all goods and there is no role for advertising. Moreover, the two models pre-
dict the firm will restrict the number of varieties in opposite situations. Rayo
shows that differences in consumer valuation for status must be sufficiently
large, whereas here, these differences must be sufficiently small. I go into this
comparison in more detail later in the analysis.
Finally, I show that non-targeted advertising makes some consumers worse
off even though they enjoy high equilibrium status. When the firm sells a sin-
gle variety, a ban on non-targeted advertising will increase social welfare by
encouraging the firm to expand output. Nonetheless, a general tax on advertis-
ing would be counterproductive. Any tax large enough to influence the firm’s
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behaviour will actually decrease social welfare.
As in Krahmer (2006), this paper shows that non-targeted, informative ad-
vertising can generate effects more often associated with persuasion. It can
increase willingness to pay through status effects, and help differentiate largely
similar goods.
Informative advertising transmits product information such as price, avail-
ability, characteristics or quality. It is direct if such credible information is
directly included in the ad, as in Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
and Meurer and Stahl (1994). Informative advertising is indirect if it serves as
a signal, for example of price (Bagwell and Ramey 1994) or quality (Milgrom
and Roberts 1986, Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984).
Persuasive advertising directly affects consumer preferences or utility. Ad-
vertising may actually change consumer preferences (Dixit and Norman 1978),
or enter directly into the utility function as a complement to consumption
(Stigler and Becker 1977, Becker and Murphy 1993). That can reflect the idea
that advertising itself creates prestige or differentiation from other goods.
Advertising in this paper is direct and purely informative. It can be thought
of as transmitting information about a variety’s existence, where it can be pur-
chased, its appearance, price, or what type of people are likely to buy it. Broad,
non-targeted advertising informs people, strengthens the signal from buying and
changes the status from that variety. Non-targeted advertising also increases
the difference in status between different varieties by making consumers in each
market segment easier to identify. Krahmer (2006) shows that this allows a
firm to differentiate its brand from those of rivals, whereas I show it allows a
monopolist to increase differentiation between its own varieties.
Various other explanations have been put forward for non-targeted advertis-
ing. Targeting may simply be impossible because of imperfect technology, but
that is not convincing for cases where the lack of targeting is extreme.
A related reason is that perfect targeting may be too costly. Advertising
costs differ, and the cheapest way to reach a target market might be to advertise
in media with a broader reach. Hernandez-Garcia (1997), Esteban et al. (2001),
and Esteban et al. (2006) look at this cost reason and conclude that under quite
general circumstances, targeting is still optimal.
Another type of explanation relates to anchoring. A consumer may feel
something is a better deal if he knows about similar but more expensive goods.
That is, the utility from a particular choice may depend on the salient available
alternatives (Swinkels and Samuelson 2006). Though plausible, that cannot
explain why a firm advertises to consumers it does not expect to buy any of its
goods.
Finally, firms may advertise to signal product characteristics. Seemingly
wasteful advertising may itself signal high quality (Nelson 1974). The mecha-
nism here differs in that advertising does not signal anything, but instead helps
consumers signal to one another. It is therefore not limited to experience goods,
whose characteristics cannot be observed before purchase.
This work can also be related to models of consumption with network ex-
ternalities. There, advertising can help consumers coordinate on purchases by
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acting as a public signal or promoting common knowledge about a product (Pas-
tine and Pastine 2002, Chwe 2001). Here, consumers care not about who else
buys a particular good, but who is believed to do so.7
In a general sense, this paper is related to the consumer research literature on
symbolic consumption. Levy (1959) argues possessions are not only important
for what they are, but also for what they mean. People may consider possessions
as an extension of the self, and they can help both to develop one’s self-concept
and to signal to others (Belk 1988). In particular, consumers often mention
clothing, perfume and cars as means of self-expression (Aaker 1996).
In reality, ads for high-end goods may not explicitly state the price, which
might seem odd if firms want to exploit status effects. That being said, firms
often use their ads to explicitly portray what type of consumers are likely to buy
their goods, and it is these beliefs that matter for social status. Ads often depict
carefully selected lifestyle categories of consumers, so consumption choices can
tell us a person’s social type (Englis and Solomon 1995). For example, ads
of Louis Vuitton suggest a connection with wealth and sophistication. Indeed,
when visibility is high, signaling lifestyle is an important feature of many goods
(Levy 1963). Firms can also suggest that certain reference groups are important
by using obvious group members as spokespersons in advertisements (Kotler and
Keller 2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
and Section 3 analyzes the case of a single variety. Section 4 considers the
general case where the firm can sell multiple varieties. Section 5 looks at how
selling the status good affects welfare, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are
in the appendix.
2 The Model
A monopolist sells up to N ≥ 1 varieties of a status good, where N is exoge-
nous. It produces each variety at constant marginal cost, normalized to zero.
Consumers are initially uninformed about these varieties, which are new on the
market.
Consumers differ only in their type θ, which is uniformly distributed on
[θL, θH ] with θL ≥ 0. Willingness to pay varies with type, which can be seen as
a proxy for wealth. Each consumer’s type is private information.
For each variety xj , the firm sets price pj and decides to which consumers
it will advertise. The advertising technology allows the firm to directly choose
which types will receive an ad, aj ⊆ [θL, θH ]. The strategy of the firm, Sf , is
therefore a choice of pj and aj for each xj , j = 1, . . . , N .
A consumer of type θ becomes informed about variety xj if he receives an
ad for it, θ ∈ aj . Let Iθ denote the set of varieties of which type θ is informed,
given the firm’s advertising.
Type θ can buy one unit of a single variety, and only of a variety of which he
is informed. He can also decide to buy nothing. Buying nothing can be viewed
7I would like to thank Volker Nocke for suggesting this parallel.
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as actually buying from a known, no-name seller who does not advertise, where
competition has driven price down to marginal cost (see Krahmer (2006)).
After receiving the ads, type θ makes a conjecture about what other con-
sumers will believe about his type, conditional on his purchase. This conjecture
is relevant because his eventual social status will depend on these beliefs. Type
θ then makes a purchase.
The strategy of type θ, denoted by Sθ, is therefore a rule which, for any
choice Sf of the firm, selects an element xj ∈ Iθ. Let Sθ(Sf ) denote the action
prescribed by this strategy if the firm plays Sf . I assume that each consumer
observes the firm’s full strategy, Sf , before making a conjecture and taking an
action. I comment more on observability of the firm’s strategy and visibility of
varieties at the end of this section, where I also present an alternative interpre-
tation of this assumption.
Each consumer then forms beliefs about the type of others, based on what
they have purchased. Variety xj is visible to type θ if and only if he himself has
received an ad for it, xj ∈ Iθ. Type θ can distinguish between consumers who
buy different varieties that are visible to him. He cannot distinguish between
different consumers who buy varieties that are not visible to him, or between
these consumers and those who buy nothing. The latter assumption reflects the
above interpretation of a no-name seller. For example, rather than go without
clothes, a cellular phone or an mp3 player, consumers will buy generic goods
from little known producers. These goods may be virtually impossible for an
uninformed observer to distinguish from brand-name varieties he does not rec-
ognize. He may simply not notice any difference.
Pay-offs are then realized and the game ends. I assume advertising is costly
but these costs are small. The firm will therefore take costs into account when
choosing its strategy, but their magnitude will not drive the results. To capture
this idea, I set the explicit cost of advertising to zero in the analysis, but as-
sume the firm uses the following lexicographic tie-breaking rule. If two different
strategies both yield the highest revenue, then the firm chooses the strategy
with strictly less advertising,
∑N
j=1 |aj |.
Each consumer makes the purchase which maximizes his utility, given his
conjecture about what others will believe about his type. The utility of type
θ consists of intrinsic utility and status utility : Uθ = (1 − λ)UI + λUS . The
relative weight on status is λ ∈ (0, 1), which is the same for all types.
If type θ buys nothing, then his intrinsic utility is zero. If he buys any variety
xj , his intrinsic utility equals his type minus the price:
UI = θ − pj . (1)
Higher types enjoy more intrinsic utility than lower types from any given
variety. Varieties are essentially identical, in the sense of each giving the same
intrinsic utility.
The status utility of type θ equals the average belief of all other consumers
about his type8:
8Another specification would be that utility depends directly on a consumer’s conjectures,
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US =
1
θH − θL
∫ θH
θL
µθ′(θ)dθ′. (2)
Here, µθ′(θ) is the belief of type θ′ about the type of another consumer,
whose true type is θ.
To complete the description of the model, I impose conditions on beliefs and
conjectures. Consumers form beliefs about each others’ type, whenever possible,
using Bayes’ rule.
Consider a given candidate equilibrium and suppose the firm plays Sf , which
need not be its equilibrium strategy. Let Sξ(Sf ) be the action that is then
prescribed by type ξ’s equilibrium strategy. The beliefs of type θ about another
consumer, whose true type is θ′, are specified as follows.
Suppose θ′ buys a variety that θ recognizes, xj ∈ Iθ. Then θ believes he
is the average type who would buy this variety if all consumers played their
equilibrium strategies:
µθ(θ′) =
∫ θH
θL
ξ1Sξ(Sf )=xjdξ∫ θH
θL
1Sξ(Sf )=xjdξ
=
1
qj
∫ θH
θL
ξ1Sξ(Sf )=xjdξ. (3)
Suppose θ′ does not buy any variety that θ recognizes, xj 6∈ Iθ. Then
θ believes he is the average type who would not buy any such variety, if all
consumers played their equilibrium strategies:
µθ(θ′) =
∫ θH
θL
ξ1Sξ(Sf ) 6∈Iθdξ∫ θH
θL
1Sξ(Sf ) 6∈Iθdξ
=
1
θH − θL −
∑
xj∈Iθ qj
∫ θH
θL
ξ1Sξ(Sf ) 6∈Iθdξ. (4)
Type θ cannot use Bayes’ rule if he is informed about all varieties, expects
all consumers to buy some variety, but instead type θ′ buys nothing. I argue in
the following section that θ should then believe the deviating consumer has the
lowest possible type, θL. I cannot apply standard refinements, defined in terms
of best replies, since consumers do not take any actions after forming these
beliefs. That being said, allowing for other out-of-equilibrium beliefs would not
have an important effect on the results.
Each consumer’s conjecture is correct, in the sense of reflecting the actual
beliefs others will have about his type, conditional on his purchase. A consumer
knows that others also observe Sf and they form beliefs in the same way he
does. He is therefore able to correctly predict their beliefs about his type. That
means he can predict the status utility from any purchase, and make the choice
that maximizes his utility.
There is also the issue of multiple equilibria. I take the same approach as
Rayo (2005), and assume the firm can coordinate consumers on the equilibrium
which gives the highest profits.
rather than what others actually believe. That would not affect the equilibrium outcome.
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I end this section with a discussion about observability of the firm’s strategy.
It is important that each consumer observe pj and aj of all varieties xj for which
he receives an ad. This is analogous to signaling models of advertising, where
consumers need to observe the firm’s advertising expenditures. If a consumer
did not observe aj for the variety he ended up buying, the firm could profitably
deviate by eliminating all non-targeted advertising for xj , and the consumer
would not notice.
I assume consumers also observe price and advertising for all other vari-
eties, possibly hearing about these ads through word-of-mouth communication.
Above all, this assumption is made for practical purposes. It amounts to assum-
ing that the firm can commit to a mechanism (price and advertising for each
variety), which is designed to be incentive compatible (each consumer purchases
the desired variety). The assumption allows me to focus on the main issue at
hand, the firm’s trade-off between status effects and price discrimination when
designing this mechanism, which is something that has not been considered
before.
If the firm’s strategy were not fully observable, then I would have to specify
beliefs following a deviation by the firm. The question is what a consumer should
believe about the ads he does not see, after himself receiving an unexpected ad.
More generally, if one player notices that another player has deviated from
his equilibrium strategy, but does not observe the full deviation, what should
he believe this deviation actually was? Questions of this nature have been
considered before, including by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Rey and Verg
(2004), but in a very different context. They look at an upstream monopolist
that supplies two retailers, where the contract with one retailer is unobservable
to the other. Retailers later compete in the product market, and each must
form beliefs about the contract offered to its rival, given the contract it receives.
These papers consider the consequences of what they call passive and wary
beliefs.
The situation here is quite different, however, and applying these concepts to
the current setting is significantly more complicated. A consumer who receives
an unexpected ad can observe who else has also received it, and he knows
that these consumers must notice the deviation. He therefore knows that these
consumers cannot retain their equilibrium beliefs. The firm can also determine
which consumers notice the deviation, and the extent to which they realize that
others notice, by its choice of advertising and hence by the deviation itself.
Moreover, unlike the situation with two retailers, consumers care directly about
others’ beliefs rather than actions. It is difficult to say what consumers should
believe in such circumstances.
An alternative interpretation of the assumption I make is that consumers
only observe the price and advertising of varieties for which they receive an
ad, but they react negatively to any deviation they notice from the firm. A
basic premise of this paper is that social relationships matter. A consumer who
notices a deviation should reason that the firm is trying to fool others, so that
they hold beliefs about type that are incorrect. The consumer may decide not
to give his business to a firm that acts in such a way. In that case, the firm will
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have no incentive to deviate and equilibrium results will be identical to the case
with full observability.
3 Analysis - Single Variety
The main focus of the paper is on multiple varieties, but it is instructive to
first consider the single variety case. Assuming N = 1 demonstrates the basic
mechanism at work relating advertising to social status. It also generates a
number of new insights. In terms of notation, I will omit the subscript on x1,
p1 and a1 since there cannot be any confusion about which variety it refers to.
If consumers did not value status, the firm would just solve the standard
problem of a monopolist facing a downward sloping demand curve. When decid-
ing whether to reduce its price, it would balance the increased revenue through
higher sales against the lower revenue on the quantity it already sells. The firm
would never use non-targeted advertising. It would only advertise to inform
those consumers who it expects to buy the good.
When consumers value status, the firm also has another incentive to adver-
tise. It can exploit consumers’ desire for status by advertising the good not only
to consumers who buy, but also to all poorer consumers who do not.
Proposition 1. Let N = 1. Then the firm always sets a = [θL, θH ]. Define
λ∗ ≡ 2θH − 4θL
3θH − 5θL . (5)
If λ < λ∗, then quantity sold and price are
q =
2θH − λ(θH + θL)
4(1− λ) , (6)
p =
2θH − λ(θH + θL)
4
, (7)
where type θ buys if and only if
θ ≥ θH − q.
If instead λ ≥ λ∗, then quantity sold and price are
q = θH − θL,
p = (1− λ)θL + λ(θH − θL2 ), (8)
and all consumers buy.
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Just like in the baseline case, the firm only sells to consumers above some
critical type. The main qualitative difference lies in the firm’s choice of adver-
tising. The firm now advertises to all consumers, so unless it serves the whole
market this involves non-targeted advertising. The intuition is as follows.
In the absence of status effects, differences in intrinsic utility mean the firm
would only sell to consumers above some critical type. For any given quantity
sold, doing so maximizes the willingness to pay of the marginal consumer.
Selling above some critical type is also optimal when consumers value status,
because it maximizes the difference between the expected type who buys and the
expected type who does not. Consumers then have a positive status incentive
to buy, since buying sends a positive signal. The signal is stronger when more
consumers recognize the good, which gives the firm an incentive to advertise as
broadly as possible.
The result reflects the intuition described in the introduction. The firm
advertises the status good to consumers who buy it, but also to others who
cannot afford it. Doing so increases the status incentive to buy, which lets the
firm increase its price.
Two additional features of the result are new compared to Krahmer (2006).
Both features stem from the fact that there are more than two consumer types.
First, the firm’s incentive to exploit status effects through advertising need not
decrease if it increases quantity sold, despite the good becoming less exclusive.
Second, consumers’ desire for social status counteracts the monopolist’s natural
tendency to restrict output, so that it serves a larger part of the market. The
interplay between status effects, advertising and output will play an important
role when considering a tax or ban on advertising, which I discuss in Section 5.
Expanding output does not necessarily decease the status incentive to buy,
because it affects the status utility from both buying and not buying. By Propo-
sition 1, expanding output is equivalent to decreasing the critical value of the
lowest type to buy. The average type who buys is then lower, which decreases
willingness to pay. However, the average type who does not buy is also lower.
This has the opposite effect on willingness to pay, because buying nothing is
each consumer’s outside option.
The net impact of expanding output on the status incentive to buy will de-
pend on the distribution of types. Here, where types are uniformly distributed,
the two effects exactly cancel and expanding output leaves the status incentive
to buy unchanged. Regardless of the critical value, the difference between the
average type who buys and the average type who does not is (θH−θL)/2. Given
its equilibrium advertising, the firm prices just like a standard monopolist ex-
cept there is now an extra positive constant in each consumer’s willingness to
pay, λ(θH − θL)/2.
This argument implies a firm may still want to use non-targeted advertising
for a popular good owned by many people, and even if that advertising is costly.
These ads do not have much impact on the social status of those who buy. Their
purpose is to increase the stigma associated with not buying, by ensuring that
those who buy nothing are recognized.
The impact of status effects on quantity sold can be seen by differentiating
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(6) with respect to λ. The derivative is positive, which I derive in a more
general case in the following section. The reason the firm expands output when
consumers place a large weight on status is that differences in willingness to pay
are then small. Higher types differ from lower types only in that they enjoy
more intrinsic utility from any purchase. In contrast, status is a zero sum game,
where all consumers value status to the same extent. If the weight consumers
place on status increases, differences between types will decrease and the firm
has less incentive to restrict output.
If all consumers buy, I need to specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs about some-
one who deviates by buying nothing. Proposition 1 assumes such a consumer is
believed to have the lowest possible type, θL. This assumption is natural, in that
type θL has the greatest incentive to deviate. For any given out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, the difference between his utility in equilibrium and after deviating is
lower than for any other type. As well, the set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs
which would make the deviation profitable is larger than for any other type, in
the sense of set inclusion. This argument is very much in the spirit of the D1
refinement (Cho and Kreps 1987). The refinement cannot be explicitly applied
here however, because it is defined in terms of best responses, and consumers
do not take actions after they form beliefs.
These out-of-equilibrium beliefs are also intuitive, in that they are the lim-
iting beliefs of a sequence of equilibria where quantity sold tends to θH − θL. If
λ < λ∗, then the firm does not serve the whole market and beliefs about those
who buy nothing follow from Bayes rule. As λ tends to λ∗, quantity sold in-
creases and tends to θH−θL. Beliefs about consumers who buy nothing become
more negative and tend to θL. In this sense, the assumption assures that beliefs
are continuous in λ.
4 Analysis - Multiple Varieties
I now consider the general case where the firm can sell up to N varieties. In
the baseline case without status effects, the firm would just divide the market
into N segments and charge a different price to consumers in each segment.
The price of each variety would make the lowest type to buy it indifferent with
buying nothing, and the firm would advertise each variety only to those who
buy it.
Status effects now give the firm an incentive to use non-targeted advertising
for all varieties.
Proposition 2. The firm sets critical values θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥, . . . , θM , with M ≤ N .
It sells x1 to all types θ ∈ [θ1, θH ] and xj to all types θ ∈ [θj+1, θj) for 2 ≤ j ≤
M . The firm sets a1 = [θL, θH ] and aj = [θL, θj−1) for 2 ≤ j ≤ M . It sets pj
to make type θj indifferent between buying xj and buying nothing.
Just as with a single variety, an important difference with the baseline case
lies with the firm’s choice of advertising. The firm still divides the market into
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segments, but now advertises each variety to all consumers who buy and to all
lower types.
The driving force behind Proposition 2 is the firm’s trade-off between broad
advertising to exploit status effects, and more targeted advertising to better
price discriminate. Before discussing this trade-off in more detail, I describe a
few features of the equilibrium.
One feature of the equilibrium is that lower types receive more ads than
higher types. Poor consumers are better informed, in the sense of being able
to buy and recognize more varieties, but this does not necessarily leave them
better off. The majority of ads they receive are for expensive varieties that they
cannot afford.
Another feature is that each consumer knows more about those who are
wealthier than him, than about those who are poorer. A consumer is able to
recognize the different varieties bought by all higher types. He can make fine
distinctions between those who are slightly wealthier, moderately wealthier and
much wealthier than him, based on the different varieties these consumers buy.
In contrast, he is unable to recognize varieties bought by any lower types. From
his perspective, they simply form a single group of poorer consumers. It is not
that he is particularly interested in recognizing wealthier consumers, but rather
that the firm can profitably exploit their desire to be recognized.
Proposition 2 shows that the firm will use non-targeted advertising for the
variety bought by the highest types, even if it fully internalizes the negative
effect this has on all others. That is, even if all consumers buy some variety in
equilibrium.9
Advertising x1 to all consumers means the firm can increase p1, since all
consumers now recognize those who buy it as the highest types. Those who
buy other varieties are now recognized as not having the highest type, which
decreases their status. However, the same applies to any consumer who decides
to buy nothing, which is the most attractive outside option. Advertising x1
to all consumers therefore decreases their utility but leaves willingness to pay
for other varieties unchanged. Non-targeted advertising works by increasing
the stigma associated with consumers’ outside option, whether or not anybody
actually takes that outside option in equilibrium.
Stronger still, exploiting status effects can be understood fully in terms of
increasing the stigma associated with buying nothing. The proof of the propo-
sition shows that firm profits can be written as the sum of two terms: profits
stemming from intrinsic utility and profits stemming from status utility. Profits
from status utility can themselves be expressed as a constant, minus a term
that is proportional to the average belief about consumers who buy nothing.
To maximize profits from status utility, the firm must make beliefs about types
who buy nothing as negative as possible.
Proposition 2 also shows that the firm will use some non-targeted advertising
9If all consumers buy some variety, then I must specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs about a
consumer who buys nothing. Just as in the previous section, I assume this belief is θL. These
beliefs are only relevant for types θ < θM−1, since they are the only ones to receive ads for
all varieties. The same point applies below for Proposition 3.
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for all varieties, even those bought by very low types. It does so despite the
fact that these ads make low types more widely recognized and they suffer low
social status. This counterintuitive result can again be explained by the firm’s
attempts to increase the stigma of buying nothing.
Consumers who buy nothing all have type lower than θM , which is the lowest
type to buy any variety. The firm can make beliefs about these consumers as
negative as possible by ensuring they are not confused with anybody who buys
a variety. It therefore wants consumers to receive ads for as many varieties as
possible, so they can infer that those they do not recognize are precisely those
who buy nothing.
Non-targeted advertising for low-end varieties can also be understood in
terms of unraveling. Once x1 is advertised to all consumers, those who buy x2
are the highest types that consumers may not recognize. They are willing to
pay to differentiate themselves from those who buy lower-end varieties and those
who buy nothing. The firm can therefore broadly advertise x2 to lower types
and increase p2 without decreasing the price of any other variety. By repeatedly
applying the same logic, the firm will use some non-targeted advertising for all
varieties, even the variety bought by the lowest types.
Non-targeted advertising is used to increase the stigma associated with buy-
ing nothing, but as a byproduct it also helps differentiate otherwise identical
goods. Non-targeted advertising allows consumers to better identify those in
different market segments, which effectively transfers status utility from those
who buy low-end varieties to those who buy high-end varieties. All consumers
value status to the same extent, so this transfer does not affect firm profits. The
revenue the firm loses from low-end varieties is exactly offset by the revenue it
gains from high-end varieties. The firm’s use of non-targeted advertising does
increase differentiation between varieties, but that is not the reason why the
firm follows this strategy.
The best way to exploit status effects would be to advertise each variety to
all consumers, so that everyone can precisely recognize those who buy nothing
as θ < θM . The firm does not do this, however, if M ≥ 2, because it faces a
trade-off between exploiting status effects and price discrimination.
The firm can only price discriminate between different segments of the mar-
ket because high types are uninformed about the varieties bought by low types.
All consumers rank varieties in the same order. Varieties bought by low types
are unambiguously better deals, because the firm must set a low price to con-
vince low types to buy. The only reason high types do not deviate is that they
do not receive ads for these lower-end varieties.
If the firm advertised each variety to all consumers, it would lose all ability
to price discriminate. In that case, it would prefer to sell a single variety, which
would at least allow it to save on advertising costs.
The trade-off between broad advertising to exploit status effects and targeted
advertising to allow for price discrimination determines the main features of
the equilibrium: non-targeted advertising for each variety, but only to poorer
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consumers than those who buy.10 The following proposition shows that this
trade-off also determines the firm’s choice of critical values θ1, . . . θM , and hence
of quantity sold of each variety, where qj = θH −
∑j
i=1 qi. It can even cause the
firm to restrict the number of varieties put on the market.
Proposition 3. Define the critical value λ
′
as follows:
λ
′ ≡ 2(θH − θL)− 2θLN
3(θH − θL)− 2θLN ≤
2
3
. (9)
If λ < λ
′
, then the firm puts M = N varieties on the market, with
∑N
i=1 qi <
θH − θL. Quantity sold is the same for each variety, and is increasing in λ:
q =
2θH − λ(θH + θL)
2N + 2− λ(N + 3) . (10)
If λ
′ ≤ λ < 2/3, then the firm puts M = N varieties on the market and
sells to all consumers,
∑N
i=1 qi = θH − θL. Quantity sold for each variety is
q = (θH − θL)/N .
If 2/3 ≤ λ, then the firm puts M = 1 variety on the market, and sells to all
consumers. Quantity sold is q = θH − θL.
When concern for status is sufficiently high, the equilibrium is dramatically
different than the baseline case. Instead of selling a positive amount of all N
varieties, the firm prefers to sell only a single one.
The relationship between quantity sold of each variety and concern for status
is also discontinuous. When λ < 2/3, the firm sells a strictly positive amount
of all N varieties, and each quantity is weakly increasing in λ. But as soon
as λ exceeds 2/3, quantity sold jumps to zero for all varieties except one. This
result stems from how quantity sold relates to the firm’s trade-off between status
effects and price discrimination.
Profits from intrinsic utility are highest when the firm plays the same strat-
egy as in the baseline case. Profits from status utility are highest when con-
sumers have negative beliefs about those who buy nothing. This amounts to
consumers believing that those they do not recognize have low type. A consumer
who buys xj can recognize all varieties bought by higher types, and knows those
he does not recognize have type below θj . If quantity sold increases for each
variety, then θj becomes smaller and this consumer can recognize more types.
His beliefs about those he doesn’t recognize then becomes more negative.
Profits from intrinsic utility are proportional to 1−λ, and those from status
utility are proportional to λ. When λ is small, the firm can strike a balance be-
tween status effects and price discrimination by still selling N varieties, but with
quantity sold slightly higher than in the baseline case. As λ increases, the firm
increases the quantity sold of each variety. It still price discriminates between
N segments of the market, but the equilibrium outcome becomes increasingly
different from the baseline.
10The proof does not make use of the fact that consumer type is uniformly distributed, and
so the result holds for a general distribution of types.
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When λ reaches λ′, quantity sold has increased to such an extent that all
consumers buy some variety,
∑N
i=1 qi = θH − θL. The firm is unable to increase
quantity sold if λ increases still further, because there is simply nobody left
to buy. It continues to play the same strategy, but becomes more tempted to
forsake all price discrimination and just maximize profits from status utility.
It could do so by selling a single variety to all consumers, so each consumer
can recognize what everybody else buys. That is exactly what occurs when λ
reaches 2/3.
When advertising costs are small, as in this set-up, the result depends on
consumers all valuing status to the same extent. Another way for the firm to
fully exploit status effects would be to sell all N varieties, but to advertise each
variety to all consumers. Because λ does not vary with type, the firm would lose
all ability to price discriminate, and profits would be the same as from selling a
single variety. Selling N varieties is suboptimal because it involves strictly more
advertising.
If instead λ was increasing with type, the firm could advertise N to all con-
sumers and still engage in price discrimination. In this case, high types would
be willing to pay more for status than low types. By setting the appropriate
prices, the firm could ensure that different types rank varieties in different or-
ders. It could then fully exploit status effect by advertising each variety to all
consumers, and still price discriminate between different market segments.
However, this strategy still involves N times more advertising than selling a
single variety. Taking explicit account of the cost of advertising should therefore
restore the result that the firm sells a single variety.
The only comparable result in the literature is (Rayo 2005). He also looks
at a monopolist selling multiple varieties to consumers who want to signal their
type. An important difference is that consumers are fully informed of all va-
rieties, so that advertising plays no role. Social status depends only on the
average type to buy, and willingness to pay for status is increasing in type. In
equilibrium, each consumer’s best outside option is therefore to buy the variety
bought by a slightly lower type.
In this setting, the monopolist may want to restrict the number of varieties
on the market and force different types to pool on the same variety. Pooling will
reduce profits from these types, but increase profits from slightly higher types
who want to avoid the pool’s low status. For a given distribution of types, the
second effect outweighs the first if willingness to pay for status is sufficiently
convex in type.
Though there are some similarities in the set-up, the mechanism in the
current paper is very different. Here, the firm restricts the number of varieties so
that it can inform all consumers about what others buy, and fully exploit status
effects, at the lowest possible advertising cost. It will only do so if willingness to
pay for status is similar across types, which is the opposite conclusion reached
by Rayo. If the firm does restrict the number of varieties, then it will pool all
consumers onto a single one. In contrast, pooling is local in Rayo’s setting and
never involves the highest type, because there would be no higher types outside
of the pool to increase profits.
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5 Welfare
I first examine how individual consumers are affected by sale of the status good.
That is, I compare the equilibrium utility of different types to what it would
be if the firm could not sell the status good. There are no externalities in the
baseline case, so allowing the firm to sell would leave all consumers weakly better
off. If any types are now worse off, then it must be because of status effects.
Proposition 4. All types who buy nothing would have higher utility if the firm
did not sell the status good. For each variety xj, a strictly positive mass of
consumers who buy xj would also have higher utility if the firm did not sell the
status good. If λ > 2/3, then this applies to all consumers.
Selling the status good makes poor consumers who buy nothing worse off.
This is a direct consequence of status externalities. If the firm did not sell the
status good, then beliefs about all consumers would equal the prior, (θH+θL)/2.
Selling the status good reveals all those who buy nothing as having below average
type, since all θ ≥ θM buy some variety. These consumers are left worse off,
because some of their social status has been transferred to wealthier consumers.
At the same time, some types who buy each variety are also left worse off,
even some who buy high-end varieties. The reason is not that these consumers
suffer from low social status. To the contrary, consumers who buy x1 are now
revealed as having the highest types. The reason is that the stigma now asso-
ciated with buying nothing pushes these consumers to pay a high price. Beliefs
about those who buy nothing are more negative than the prior, and the firm
sets the price of each variety to make the lowest type to buy indifferent with
buying nothing. For each variety, there are therefore some consumers who are
willing to buy, but who would be better off if nobody did.
It can be that some consumers are also left better off by the firm selling the
status good, though that is not always the case. When λ > 2/3, so the firm sells
only one variety, all consumers are actually left worse off. In that case, both the
weight consumers place on social status and the stigma associated with buying
nothing are quite large. It is large enough to convince even the lowest type to
buy, at a price which leaves even the highest type worse off.
I now turn to social welfare, defined in terms of total surplus. The explicit
cost of advertising is zero and status is a zero-sum game, which implies total
surplus is just equal to the intrinsic utility enjoyed by all consumers. Total
surplus is strictly increasing in quantity sold, and I consider whether imposing
restrictions on advertising can increase total surplus above the equilibrium level.
For tractability, I assume the firm can only sell one variety.
If the social planner could choose both price and advertising, then he would
clearly advertise and sell the status good to all consumers. A more interesting
situation is when the firm retains control over the price. Through possible
restrictions on advertising, the social planner can then encourage the firm to
expand output.
I consider two possible restrictions on advertising. The first restriction is
a ban on non-targeted advertising, so that the firm could only advertise to
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consumers who will buy the good. The second restriction is a general tax on
the volume of advertising.
Proposition 5. Let N = 1, and suppose λ < λ
′
from (9) so that q < θH − θL.
Say there was a ban on non-targeted advertising. Then compared to Propo-
sition 1, this ban decreases p, and increases both q and total surplus.
Say there was a tax on advertising, so that informing a mass m of consumers
cost cm, with c > 0. Then there exists a threshold value such that, for c be-
low this threshold, the results are identical to Proposition 1. For c above this
threshold, the firm only uses targeted advertising, and the tax decreases both q
and total surplus.
A ban on non-targeted advertising increases total surplus by providing the
firm with an incentive to increase quantity sold. In the presence of status effects,
the firm would like to inform as many consumers as possible about the variety it
sells. In Proposition 1, the firm restricts sales to consumers with sufficiently high
willingness to pay, and informs all others through non-targeted advertising. A
ban on non-targeted advertising prevents the firm from doing so. Now, the only
way to inform more consumers is to charge a lower price and expand output.
A ban on non-targeted advertising may be difficult to implement, as it would
force policy makers to differentiate between different forms of ads. An alterna-
tive would be to put in place a tax that is proportional to the total volume of
advertising. Such a tax can convince the firm to only use targeted advertising,
but the proposition shows that it would be counterproductive.
A linear tax which is sufficiently small will not affect the firm’s strategy. The
firm will continue to use non-targeted advertising and set the same price as in
Proposition 1. If the tax is sufficiently high, then the firm will switch to only
targeted advertising. The problem is that under targeted advertising, the firm
must increase advertising expenditures to increase quantity sold. A high tax
therefore leads the firm to reduce output. The proof shows that any tax large
enough to make the firm choose targeted advertising will lead to lower quantity
sold than in Proposition 1, and so lower social welfare. The problem is that the
tax does not differentiate between targeted and non-targeted ads.11
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that consumer status seeking can explain why firms some-
times use non-targeted advertising. Advertising informs consumers about the
existence of goods and allows them to buy, but also allows them to recognize
goods when bought by others. Non-targeted advertising can promotes conspicu-
ous consumption, not through persuasion, but just by transmitting information
that allows consumers to signal through their purchases.
The results show that a monopolist selling multiple varieties will advertise
each variety to those who buy, and also to all poorer consumers. Doing so strikes
11Allowing the social planner to directly choose the level of advertising, would also be
counterproductive. It would also lead the monopolist to reduce quantity sold.
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a balance between broad, non-targeted advertising to exploit status effects, and
targeted advertising to better price discriminate. If concern for status is suffi-
ciently high, then the firm will sell only a single variety. Doing so allows it to
fully exploit status effects at the lowest possible advertising cost.
An interesting avenue for further research would be to explore how the mech-
anism in this paper relates to comparative advertising, where one firm’s ads refer
to a rival firm’s products. One piece of unfavourable information about a low-
end good is that consumers who buy it are poor, so they may lose social status if
the good is widely recognized. It would be interesting to see if a rival firm selling
a high-end good might use comparative advertising to inform consumers about
the low-end good, ensuring it is recognized and thus obtaining a competitive
advantage.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a candidate equilibrium with given q and |a| = m ≥ q.
By monotonicity of (1), the firm can set p equal to the willingness to pay of the lowest
type to buy, θ0. By (3) and (4), utility from buying is
(1− λ)θ0 + λ

(
m
θH − θL )
1
q
Z θH
θL
θ′1bθ′=xdθ
′ + (1− m
θH − θL )(
θH + θL
2
)
ff
,
where the term in large brackets is the weighted average of what informed and
uninformed consumers believe about the type of someone who buys. Assuming q <
θH − θL, by a similar logic the utility from not buying is
λ

(
m
θH − θL )(
1
θH − θL − q )
Z θH
θL
θ′1bθ′=∅dθ
′ + (1− m
θH − θL )(
θH + θL
2
)
ff
,
which gives
p = (1− λ)θ0 + λ( m
θH − θL )

1
q
Z θH
θL
θ′1bθ′=xdθ
′ − ( 1
θH − θL − q )
Z θH
θL
θ′1bθ′=∅dθ
′
ff
.
Given q, setting θ0 = θH − q maximizes both θ0 and the term in large brackets.
The price is then strictly increasing in m so the firm sets a = [θL, θH ]. Simplifying
gives
p = (1− λ)(θH − q) + λ(θH − θL
2
), (11)
pi = q
ˆ
(1− λ)(θH − q) + λ(θH − θL
2
).
˜
(12)
Profits are strictly concave in q. Taking the first order condition gives
q =
2θH − λ(θH + θL)
4(1− λ) ,
and plugging back into (11) yields
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p =
2θH − λ(θH + θL)
4
.
This indeed implies q < θH − θL iff λ < λ∗, given by (5):
λ <
2θH − 4θL
3θH − 5θL .
Say instead λ ≥ λ∗. Then the first-order condition is never satisfied for any
q < θH − θL. For any such q, the firm could earn higher profits in another equilibrium
where q is marginally higher.
Say the firm chooses q = θH − θL, and let µ be the out-of-equilibrium belief about
a consumer who deviates by buying nothing. The firm can charge price
p = (1− λ)(θH − q) + λ(θH + θL
2
− µ), (13)
evaluated at q = θH − θL. Profits are decreasing in µ. If µ = θL, then (13)
coincides with (11), which implies profits are increasing in q. It is indeed optimal to
have q = θH − θL, so
p = (1− λ)θL + λ(θH − θL
2
).
If µ > θL, then (13) is strictly less than (11) for any q. Rather than choosing
q = θH − θL, the firm can earn strictly higher profits in another candidate equilibrium
where q = θH − θL − , for  > 0 and small. As  tends to zero, profits increase and
tend to (12) evaluated at q = θH − θL.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider profits in a candidate equilibrium where the firm
sells a strictly positive quantity of M ≤ N varieties. Denote the lowest type to buy
xk by θk, and order varieties such that θM < θM−1 < . . . < θ1. Let µj be the average
belief about a consumer who buys xj , and µnot the average belief about a consumer
who buys nothing, as given by (2).
All consumers must rank varieties in the same order. Type θ obtains utility (1 −
λ)θ+ λµj − pj from xj . He prefers xj to xk if and only if λµj − pj > λµk − pk, which
is independent of θ.
The incentive to buy any variety xj over buying nothing is increasing in type. If
θ0 prefers xj to buying nothing, then all types θ > θ0 do as well, because (1 − λ)θ +
λµj − pj ≥ λµnot is easier to satisfy for larger θ.
For each xj , there must be some consumer who buys xj who is indifferent with his
best outside option. If not, the firm could increase pj by some  > 0 and leave quantity
sold of each variety unchanged. Consumers who buy xj would still prefer it to their
best outside option, and those who buy other varieties now have a lower incentive to
switch to xj . That outside option is either to buy nothing or to buy another variety.
If any type who buys xj is indifferent with buying nothing, then it must be θj ,
because he is the lowest type. Furthermore, there must be at least one variety where
this is in fact the case. Otherwise, all consumers would strictly prefer their own variety
to buying nothing. The firm could then increase each pj by the same  > 0 and again
leave quantity sold unchanged, because it would not change the ranking of varieties.
I group the varieties into C categories with 1 ≤ C ≤ M . In each category, I
place all the varieties about which consumers are indifferent. Let Nk be the number
of varieties in category k, and denote these varieties by xk1, . . . , xkNk . Let θki be the
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lowest type to buy xki, for 1 ≤ i ≤ Nk. I order varieties so that θkNk < . . . < θk1,
so the lowest type to buy a variety from category k is θkNk . I order the categories so
that θkNk < . . . < θ1N1 , so the lowest type to buy any variety at all is θCNC .
Type θkNk , the lowest type to buy from category k, must be indifferent between
variety xkNk and buying nothing. If θkNk was not indifferent, then any other type
θ who buys from category k would also strictly prefer his variety to buying nothing,
since θ > θkNk . The firm could increase the price of each variety in category k by the
same  > 0 and leave quantity sold unchanged. All consumers who buy from category
k would remain indifferent between these varieties, and none would want to switch
to a different category or to buy nothing. Consumers who buy from other categories
would now have less of an incentive to switch to category k, so the firm would not be
forced to decrease any of its other prices.
Consumers strictly prefer all varieties in category k to all varieties in category j
whenever j < k. The lowest types to buy from these categories are θkNk and θjNj
with θkNk < θjNj . Both types are indifferent with buying nothing, but higher types
have a greater incentive to buy any variety. That means θjNj strictly prefers varieties
in category k to those in category j, and all consumers have the same ranking. In
particular, this implies that the firm cannot advertise any variety in category k to
consumers who buy from category j, for any j < k. The consumers, having received
the ad, would then prefer to switch.
By definition, consumers are indifferent between varieties in each category. That
implies, for any xki in category k, the difference in price between xki and xkNk must
equal the difference in status utility between the two varieties:
pki − pkNk = λµki − λµkNk . (14)
Total profits from all varieties in category k are pik =
PNk
i=1 pkiqki. Using (14) gives
pik =
NkX
i=1
[pkNk + λ(µki − µkNk )]qki.
The price of variety xkNk makes type θkNk indifferent with buying nothing:
pkNk = (1− λ)θkNk + λ(µkNk − µnot). (15)
Substituting (15) into pik and simplifying gives
pik =
NkX
i=1
[(1− λ)θkNk + λ(µµki − µnot)]qki.
Define Qk ≡
PNk
i=1 qki, the total mass of consumers who buy varieties in category
k. Then total profits from all categories equal
pi = (1− λ)
CX
k=1
θkNkQk + λ
MX
j=1
(µj − µnot)qj . (16)
The first summation gives profits from intrinsic utility, which depend on the quan-
tity sold in each category and the lowest type to buy from each category. The sec-
ond summation gives profits from status utility, which depend on the beliefs about
consumers who buy each variety compared to the beliefs about consumers who buy
nothing. The status incentive to buy xj is λ(µj − µnot).
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In equilibrium, the average of all beliefs, taken over all consumers, must equal the
prior:
MX
j=1
(
qj
θH − θL )µj + (1−
PM
j=1 qj
θH − θL )µnot =
θH + θL
2
.
Rearranging and substituting means that equilibrium profits can be written as
(1− λ)
CX
k=1
θkNkQk + λ(θH − θL)(
θH + θL
2
− µnot). (17)
Keep the order of categories fixed, as well as the quantity sold of each category,
QC , . . . , Q1. Profits from the intrinsic utility, given by the first summation in (17)
are maximized if the firm sets θkNk = θH −
Pk
j=1Qk. For each category, all types who
buy a variety from that category would then lie on a single interval. Having multiple
disjoint intervals of types buying from the same category would strictly decrease θkNk
for some k without increasing it for any other k.
Profits from status utility are also maximized by setting θkNk = θH −
Pk
j=1Qk,
and advertising each variety in category k to all θ < θk−1Nk−1 . Each consumer is
then informed about the varieties bought by as many consumers as possible: someone
who buys from category k receives ads for all varieties in categories 1, . . . , k, bought
by
Pk
i=1Qk consumers. Moreover, all of these consumers he now recognizes have
type over a threshold, namely θkNk . Together, this makes the average type that each
consumer does not recognize as low as possible. By (4), it makes his belief about those
he does not recognize as low as possible, and therefore minimizes µnot. That implies
a candidate equilibria of this form gives the highest profits.
I now argue there can be only one variety per category. Say there were multiple
varieties in category k. From above, all varieties in category k are advertised to
the same consumers. Compare profits from another candidate equilibrium where all
varieties in category k are replaced by a single variety. The lowest type to buy from
any category remains the same, so profits from intrinsic utility in (17) are unchanged.
The set of types that each consumer recognizes also remains the same, so µnot is also
unchanged. Profits according to (17) remain the same, but the firm now uses strictly
less advertising.
Proof of Proposition 3. Using (17) and the fact that there is one variety per
category, profits are
pi = (1− λ)
NX
j=1
qj(θH −
jX
i=1
qi) + λ(θH − θL)(θH + θL
2
− µnot), (18)
where I have set N =M , but the firm can always choose to qj = 0 for any variety
xj . The first order condition is
∂pi
∂qj
= (1− λ)(θH −
NX
i=1
qi − qj)− λ(θH − θL)∂µnot
∂qj
= 0.
As before, µnot is the average belief about consumers who buy nothing, which is
the weighted average of the beliefs taken over all consumers about those they don’t
recognize:
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µnot =
N−1X
i=1
(
qi
θH − θL )(
θL + θH −Pij=1 qj
2
)+ [1−
N−1X
i=1
qi
θH − θL ](
θL + θH −PNj=1 qj
2
).
(19)
By Proposition 2, a consumer who buys xi receives ads for all xj with j ≤ i. Those
he does not recognize are uniformly distributed on [θL, θH −Pij=1 qj ]. The term in
square brackets in (19) is the combined mass of consumers who buy xN and those
who buy nothing. They all receive ads for each variety, so they hold the same beliefs.
Rearranging and differentiating gives
∂µnot
∂qj
=
1
2(θH − θL) (
NX
i=1
qi − qj)− 1
2
.
Plugging into the first order condition gives
∂pi
∂qj
= (1−λ)(θH−
NX
i=1
qi−qj)−λ(θH−θL)

1
2(θH − θL) (
NX
i=1
qi−qj)− 1
2
ff
= 0. (20)
These are N linear equations in N unknowns. By symmetry, the solution is qj = Q,
j = 1, . . . , N , given by (10):
Q =
2θH − λ(θH + θL)
2N + 2− λ(N + 3) .
The solution is indeed interior if NQ < θH − θL. Rearranging shows this is
equivalent to λ < λ
′
, as given by (9):
λ <
2(θH − θL)− 2θLN
3(θH − θL)− 2θLN ,
where λ
′ ≤ 2/3. To check the second order condition, we have
∂2pi
∂q2j
= −2(1− λ), ∂
2pi
∂qi∂qj
=
λ
2
− 1, i 6= j.
The Hessian has two eigenvalues: ( 3+N
2
)λ− (N +1) and (3λ− 2)/2. It is negative
definite for λ < 2/3. Since λ
′ ≤ 2/3, the above solution is indeed the optimum for
λ < λ
′
. Taking the derivative of Q gives
dQ
dλ
=
−(θH + θL)[2N + 2− λ(N + 3)] + (N + 3)[2θH − λ(θH + θL)]
[2N + 2− λ(N + 3)]2 .
Canceling terms, the derivative is positive if 2(θH − θL)− 2θLN +2θH > 0, which
holds because λ < λ
′
.
If λ ≥ λ′ , then we must have a corner solution with PNi=1 qi = θH − θL. Substi-
tuting qN = θH − θL −PN−1i=1 qi into (18) and (19) gives
pi = (1−λ)
N−1X
j=1
qj(θH−
jX
i=1
qi)+θL(θH−θL−
N−1X
j=1
qi)
ff
+λ(θH−θL)(θH + θL
2
−µnot),
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µnot =
N−1X
i=1
(
qi
θH − θL )(
θH − θL −Pij=1 qj
2
) + θL,
where I have assumed that types who buy xN hold out-of-equilibrium beliefs θL
about someone who buys nothing. The first order condition is now
∂pi
∂qj
= (1− λ)(θH − θL −
N−1X
i=1
qi − qj)− λ(θH − θL)∂µnot
∂qj
= 0,
where
∂µnot
∂qj
=
1
2(θH − θL) (θH − θL −
N−1X
i=1
qi − qj),
which implies
∂pi
∂qj
= (1− λ)(θH − θL −
N−1X
i=1
qi − qj)− λ
2
(θH − θL −
N−1X
i=1
qi − qj) = 0. (21)
These are N−1 linear equations in N−1 unknowns. By symmetry, the solution is
qj = (θH−θL)/N , j = 1, . . . , N−1. UsingPNi=1 qN = θH−θL gives qN = (θH−θL)/N .
For the second order condition, we have
∂2pi
∂q2j
= 3λ− 2, ∂
2pi
∂qi∂qj
=
3λ− 2
2
, i 6= j.
The Hessian has two eigenvalues: (N + 1)( 3λ−2
2
) and (3λ − 2)/2. It is negative
definite for all λ
′ ≤ λ < 2/3, in which case this is the optimum. The second order
condition is violated for λ ≥ 2/3, regardless of N . The optimal strategy must therefore
be a corner solution with q1 = θH − θL.
Proof of Proposition 4. All types θ < θN who buy nothing have utility λµnot. By
Proposition 2, the lowest type θj who buys variety xj is made indifferent with buying
nothing, so he also has utility λµnot. If the firm did not sell the status good, then
each consumer would just have status utility under the prior, λ(θH + θL)/2. But (19)
implies µnot < (θH + θL)/2, so that these types all now have lower status utility. By
continuity, the same applies for all types θ ∈ [θj , θj + ], for  > 0 and sufficiently
small.
If λ > 2/3, then Proposition 3 implies q = θH − θL. The price is given by (8):
p1 = (1− λ)θL + λ(θH − θL
2
).
Each consumer has the same status utility as under the prior, λ(θH + θL)/2. The
type with the highest intrinsic utility is θH , with (1 − λ)θH . A straightforward com-
parison shows that λ > 2/3 implies (1 − λ)θH < p1, so all consumers are left worse
off.
Proof of Proposition 5. I use subscript t for equilibrium values with targeted
advertising and nt with non-targeted advertising. From Proposition 1, qnt is given by
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(6) and pnt is given by (7). A ban on non-targeted advertising is only relevant in the
case of an interior solution, qnt < θH − θL. For that reason, I assume λ < λ∗ by (5):
λ <
2θH − 4θL
3θH − 5θL .
Say there is a ban on non-targeted advertising. For given q, the firm can set p
similar to (11), except now only a fraction q/(θH − θL) of consumers are informed:
p = (1− λ)(θH − q) + λ( q
θH − θL )(
θH − θL
2
),
pi = q[(1− λ)(θH − q) + λq
2
].
Taking the first order condition and solving gives
qt =
(1− λ)θH
2− 3λ ,
pt =
(1− λ)θH
2
.
The second order condition is λ < 2/3, which holds since λ < λ∗. If the above
value of qt exceeds θH − θL, then the firm sets qt = θH − θL. In that case, we clearly
have qt > qnt because of the assumption qnt < θH − θL. We then have pt as given by
(8), and comparing this to (7) gives pt < pnt. If qt < θH − θL, then simple algebra
shows that qt > qnt iff λθH + (2 − 3λ)θL > 0, and pt < pnt iff θH − θL > 0. Both
conditions hold since λ < 2/3 and θH > θL.
Now consider a tax on advertising, so that informing a mass m of consumers costs
cm > 0. To sell quantity q, the firm can set price
p = (1− λ)(θH − q) + λ( m
θH − θL )(
θH − θL
2
),
pi = q[(1− λ)(θH − q) + λm
2
]− cm.
The firm must choose q and m, subject to the constraint m ≥ q. Profits are linear
in m, so the optimum is either m = θH − θL or m = q. If m = θH − θL, then the first
order condition with respect to q is
∂pi
∂q
= (1− λ)(θH − 2q) + λ(θH − θL
2
) = 0.
This is the same as without a tax, and so implies q = qnt and q = pnt. Using (6)
and (7), profits are
pint =
1
16(1− λ) [2θH − λ(θH + θL)]
2 − (θH − θL)c. (22)
For m = q, the profit function is
pi = q[(1− λ)(θH − q) + λq
2
− c].
The first order condition is
∂pi
∂q
= (1− λ)(θH − 2q) + λq − c = 0,
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which implies
qt =
(1− λ)θH − c
2− 3λ , (23)
pt =
(1− λ)θH + c
2
.
For sufficiently large c, we have qt < θH−θL. Depending on parameter values, this
inequlity may also hold for all c. If qt < θH − θL does hold, then taking into account
the cost of advertising, profits are
pit =
1
2(2− 3λ) [(1− λ)θH − c]
2. (24)
Comparing (23) with (6), we have qt > qnt iff c < c
∗, where
c∗ ≡ λ
4(1− λ) [λθH + (2− 3λ)θL].
Say qt < θH − θL, for all c, as given by (23). Then (22) and (24) imply
pint−pit = 1
16(1− λ) [(2−λ)θH−λθL]
2− (θH−θL)c− 1
2(2− 3λ) [(1−λ)θH−c]
2, (25)
which is quadratic in c. The firm uses non-targeted advertising iff pint − pit > 0.
That is certainly the case when c = 0, since then non-targeted advertising is optimal
by Proposition 1. But the coefficient for c2 is negative, which implies pint − pit > 0 iff
c is below some strictly positive threshold.
If c is below this threshold, then the firm uses non-targeted advertising and the
results are as given in Proposition 1. I now show that c ≤ c∗ implies pint − pit > 0.
That is equivalent to pint−pit ≤ 0 implying c > c∗. So if c is high enough to induce the
firm to use targeted advertising, then it is also high enough to make qt < qnt. Total
surplus just depends on quantity sold, since status is a zero sum game, and so it too
will be lower.
Note that (25) is concave in c, so I just need to show that pint − pit > 0 at c = 0
and at c = c∗. As noted above, it must be positive at c = 0. Plugging c∗ into (25),
expanding and regrouping terms yields
pint − pit = λ
32(1− λ)2 [(5λ− 4)θL − (3λ− 2)θH ]
2,
which is also positive.
Now say (23) exceeds θH − θL for some small values of c. That is, there exists
c′ < c∗ such that c < c′ implies qnt = θH − θL. Then for all c < c′, m = θH − θL under
both targeted and non-targeted advertising, and pint− pit does not depend on c. That
means pint − pit is still concave in c, and pint − pit > 0 for all c ≤ c∗.
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